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Impact investing has captured the 
interest of mainstream investors, 
philanthropic funders, social 
entrepreneurs, and social businesses1 
alike. To its supporters, it is a US$400 
billion to US$1 trillion “headline” 
opportunity. However, for mainstream 
investors and philanthropic funders who 
 
are encouraged to shift at least 1% of 
their portfolio into this emerging asset 
class,2 the number of impact investment 
opportunities,3 while growing, does not 
seem to be anywhere near the hoped 
for billions. 
What is amiss?
 
From when it was first coined five years ago, “impact investing” 
has now become more mainstream for traditional investors. 
However, Philo Alto argues that its development is lagging behind 
the promise of what it can do, and this, in turn, is hampering its 
emergence as an asset class in its own right. 
Philo Alto is the founder of Asia Value Advisors 
(www.value.asia), a Hong Kong-based 
philanthropic advisory and research firm that 
provides bespoke philanthropy advisory and 
research to family offices, foundations, and social 
purpose organisations in Asia. He is concurrently a 
co-convenor of EngageHK, Senior Advisor to SOW 
Asia Foundation and advisor to an educational 
foundation in Malaysia. 
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Promises Lag Behind the Hype
JP Morgan’s 2010 research report defines impact 
investments as “investments intended to create positive 
impact beyond financial return;”4 in other words, the ability 
to produce financial returns on a risk-adjusted basis while 
also creating positive (social and/or environmental) impact. 
As the term gains popularity, the statistics used to 
demonstrate its growth vary widely. This has resulted in 
confusion about what impact investing is and what its 
potential is for the social space. As a result, some seed- 
and early- stage social businesses which would have 
typically sought grant funding may have re-positioned their 
businesses to be “impact investing” ready, thereby risking 
a mission drift5 in foregoing social issues or beneficiaries 
deemed too unprofitable to serve. At the same time, these 
same social businesses then wonder why there don’t seem 
to be enough impact investors who are willing to “invest.” 
Mainstream institutional investors have fiduciary 
responsibilities to their own investors (such as pension 
funds), and while they may appreciate the desire of social 
businesses to create positive social impact, they currently 
don’t perceive that there are enough organisations that also 
deliver financial returns. As a result, these investors tend to 
be far more cautious in investing in social businesses. 
In contrast, social businesses tend to receive a more 
favourable response from family offices and individual 
philanthropists who believe in a “blended value” approach to 
asset allocation and philanthropic funding. Beholden only to 
their own philanthropic goals and family legacy aspirations, 
they are more flexible in funding social businesses and tend 
to treat grants and impact investments as a continuum of 
funding choices. These funders are currently in the minority.
To illustrate, it is commonly estimated that the projected 
growth of the impact investment market ranges from 
US$400 billion to US$1 trillion over ten years (JP Morgan 
2010 report). This estimate represents the funding needs 
within the social sector over ten years, and is sometimes 
called “potential market opportunity.” 
In contrast, Acumen Fund, as one of the more experienced 
and earliest impact investors, has put in US$70 million worth 
of impact investments over its ten year history, the figure 
representing just 62 out of over 5,000 (around 1%) social 
ventures it had reviewed.6 Even within this subset, only a 
small proportion have been operating at scale. 
LGT Venture Philanthropy, another impact investment firm, 
has, to date, sourced over 4,000 deals globally and invested 
in 25 deals (well under 1%).7 Of the deals invested, around 
95% have been well on track in their respective business 
plans.8 LGT VP also has a policy of not investing at all if they 
do not find a suitable social venture that meets their investing 
criteria. 
Both Acumen and LGT Venture Philanthropy are among 
the older and more established impact investors, and their 
investments in 1 out of every 100 social ventures clearly 
suggest that the “impact investment ready” segment is 
significantly smaller than the broader funding needs in the 
social space. 
If we use this 1% success rate as a benchmark, it translates 
to at least US$4-$10 billion worth of impact investment 
opportunity globally in social businesses over the next ten 
years.9 
Impact Investing in Asia—Constrained by Supply or 
Demand of Capital?
To get a regional perspective, let us assume a similar 1% 
success rate in the Asian impact investing market. 
In my previous research published in 2011, I explained10 how 
the definitional confusion about what impact investing is has 
created vastly different expectations of its market potential. 
One report has estimated that the total potential demand for 
impact investing in Asia is between US$44 billion and $74 
billion for the decade to 2020.11 If we apply the 1% historical 
success rate for impact investing, this translates to US$440 
million to US$740 million over the next ten years. While this 
is not an amount to scoff at, it still pales in comparison to the 
social funding needs in the region, especially those at the 
“bottom of the pyramid.12”
As a result of this mismatch, the vast majority of funding 
opportunities lies in helping seed- and early-stage social 
businesses to grow in size and capability, and eventually 
hiving them off to impact investors or impact funds after they 
have received the necessary philanthropic support such as 
managerial talent, access to networking with other social 
entrepreneurs through philanthropic intermediaries and 
funders.
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“
Social businesses tend to 
receive a more favourable 
response from family 
offices and individual 
philanthropists who 
believe in a “blended value” 
approach to asset allocation 
and philanthropic funding.
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The issue, therefore, is not a dearth of impact investors, but 
a lack of risk-appropriate philanthropic funding for the vast 
majority of social businesses in Asia that are either too young 
or too small in scale to be considered “impact investment 
ready.” In fact, the social entrepreneurship activity in 
the region has picked up significantly in recent years as 
evidenced by the increasing popularity of social venture 
competitions such as Global Social Venture Competition, 
Sankalp Awards, as well as events such as the annual Social 
Enterprise Summits in Hong Kong and the recent Impact 
Forum in Singapore. Clearly, more support by philanthropic 
funders and venture philanthropy intermediaries is needed 
to help scale social businesses across their organisational 
life stages.
Given the significant growth of impact investing in recent 
years as evidenced by the number of new intermediaries 
and impact funds, it is anticipated that the quality, number, 
and scale of social businesses over the next ten years will 
grow more quickly than it has in the past ten years. This 
means that the 1% historical success rate is expected to 
rise.13
This raises the question of how we should fund the vast 
majority of social businesses? Should philanthropic funders 
just focus on, and wait for, the 1% of impact investment 
ready social businesses to come through their doors? 
Or should they proactively help accelerate the growth of 
social businesses that are considered to be “pre-impact 
investment” ready?14 
The Philanthropic Capital Map
The philanthropic capital map shows where social 
businesses can and should tap into appropriate funding 
sources as they grow in scale and impact.15 To do this, 
they need to understand the motivations of current and 
prospective funders, and ensure there is an alignment of 
incentives and expectations between their funding needs 
and the motivations (whether as philanthropy or as impact 
investment) of the funders. 
Social Focus Financial/Commercial Focus
Funder 
Motivation/
Elements
Doing Good Doing Good and 
then Doing Well
Blended 
Approach
Doing Well and 
then Doing Good
Doing Well
Organisational 
structure / 
Type
Charity/Non-profit 
organisation
Social benefit 
enterprise or 
charity with some 
earned revenues
Impact-first social 
business
Finance-first social 
business
Pure commercial 
business
Funding Type Grants and 
donations
Grants or its 
equivalent/
Impact giving
Impact giving/ 
Pre-impact 
investing funding
Impact Investing Commercial 
Investing
Funder Type Donors Impact angels/
Donors
Impact angels Impact investors Traditional 
investors
Risk Levels Pure impact 
expected
Depends on donor 
motivations
Heightened 
expectation of 
financial return in 
addition to impact
High-financial risk 
due to dual impact 
and financial return 
goals
Pure commercial 
risk
Return 
Expectations
Pure giving/ 100% 
“loss”
Leverage of impact 
expected
Leverage of 
impact expected 
with upside of 
financial return
At a minimum 
return of capital on 
risk-adjusted basis
Market returns
 
Liquidity
Deep and well-
established
Emerging, and 
usually via CSR 
budget
Illiquid, small and 
very fragmented
Deepening via 
sustainable 
investing
Deep and well-
established
Size Large and stable Small but growing Even smaller but 
growing
Large and 
increasing
Very large 
(traditional 
investing)
Awareness of 
Funding
Decades long and 
rooted in tradition
Recent years 
and increasingly 
accepted
Very recent and 
gaining strong PR
Recent decades- 
“Do no evil”
Deeply rooted 
in capitalistic 
environment
Growth 
Prospects
Stable Growing but 
lacking definitional 
boundaries
Growing and with 
growth risks
Growing steadily Stable
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Table 1: Philanthropic Motivations, Organisations, and Funding Sources
  Lien Centre for Social Innovation     43
In Table 1, individuals typically start either as philanthropically 
motivated from the Doing Good side or as an investor from 
the Doing Well side, with both eventually moving towards the 
blended value middle. Coming from the left hand side, the 
motivations are to do good and the enterprises are typically 
operational charities. For some non-profits that decide to 
wean their dependence off from grants and government 
funding, they move towards the blended middle by actively 
seeking to increase the share of their earned revenue 
streams. Coming from the right hand side, the motivations 
are pure commercial goals, moving towards responsible/
sustainable investing (“do no harm”) and towards impact 
investing. Note that for funders coming from the right, 
especially institutional investors with fiduciary duties, doing 
well is a minimum threshold (flat to positive financial returns, 
never negative) with the “doing good” component being an 
added benefit. 
In contrast, the blended approach in the middle column 
mainly encompasses the seed- and early-stage social 
businesses where financial returns are unlikely, but social 
returns are expected. Seed- and early-stage social 
businesses are typically funded by individuals and family 
offices who do not have fiduciary obligations, as well as by 
corporates’ CSR or community engagement arms. These 
latter groups traditionally support non-profits through grants 
and donations, but are increasingly more in favour of impact 
giving where financial returns are not expected. Like impact 
investing, impact giving prioritises social returns but unlike 
impact investing, it does not expect a financial return at the 
outset.
Chart 1 illustrates the idealised growth path of a social 
business as it scales and the sources of funding it seeks: 
• Seed Stage Social Venture: The enterprise starts 
off either as a social enterprise arm of a non-profit 
organisation with some earned revenue stream, 
or as a social entrepreneur with a social business 
idea. Here, grants and incubator funding support 
are the predominant sources.
• Early-Stage Social Business: The vast majority of 
social businesses remain “early stage” with revenue 
streams or concepts that are too premature for 
impact investors to consider. Since risk adjusted 
financial returns are still expected to be negative, 
this is not traditionally considered an investment 
by institutional investors. Philanthropic funders 
and intermediaries are more willing to fund from an 
impact giving perspective as part of their field and 
capacity building efforts.
• Growth-Stage Social Businesses: A small number 
of fast growing social businesses that have 
achieved sufficient scale and impact begin to 
attract impact investors. Most social businesses 
struggle to get to this stage. 
Social Finance
Chart 1: The Path to Scaling Social Businesses 
Source: Asia Value Advisors
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be successful. However, what it is called is less important 
than recognising the dangers of calling this type of funding 
“investing” for its potential to undermine its credibility as an 
emerging asset class.
• Scaled Social Businesses: Having received impact 
investment funding and demonstrated financial 
sustainability, these social businesses eventually 
become attractive to commercially-focused 
investors. The Body Shop and Ben & Jerry’s both 
used to be social businesses and they seek to 
compete on equal footing with their commercially-
driven businesses without government subsidy 
and/or philanthropic funding support.
Early Days for Impact Investing as an Asset Class—
More Impact Angels Needed 
Given the very small percentage of impact investments 
completed thus far relative to the number of social businesses 
needing funding, impact investing as an emerging asset 
class is clearly in its early days though it continues to exhibit 
a strong growth potential. Chart 2 below shows that the 
majority of early-stage social businesses continue to rely 
on one-off grants and patient capital that can tolerate sub-
optimal, possibly negative, financial returns. 
I like to refer to philanthropic funders willing to support early-
stage and untested social businesses as “Impact Angels” to 
reflect the “giving” nature of this type of funding support—
giving, as opposed to investing, because of its higher risk 
and therefore the possibility of up to 100% write-off (which 
is financially no different from a grant or donation) but with 
a potential financial return if the social business proves to 
Savvy Advocacy
Chart 2: Funding Chasm Faced by Social Businesses
As they scale and transform from initial start-up/seed-stage, 
to early/growth stage, most social businesses face two 
critical funding and organisational hurdles:
• Initial Funding: It can be very difficult for a budding 
social entrepreneur to demonstrate the validity 
and sustainability of her concept. This is why 
competitions for social entrepreneurs (e.g. Echoing 
Green, Global Social Venture Competition or 
Sankalp Awards) are important to help screen and 
support the best business plans and entrepreneurs.
• The Leap from Pre-Impact Investing to the Impact 
Investing-Ready Stage: The second hurdle tends 
to be bigger as funding needs are generally larger, 
and organisational and cultural changes need to 
be made to meet the exacting requirements of 
impact investors (e.g. introducing good corporate 
governance structures). The challenge for fast-
growing social businesses is to get themselves 
ready for impact investors even as they continue 
to seek one-off funding in the interim. For a vast 
majority, this interim period may last for a long time. 
Source: Asia Value Advisors
”
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Moving Beyond the Hype for Impact Investing 
For impact investing to emerge as an asset class in its own 
right, we need to overcome the various issues that hinder its 
development: 
• Loose Terminology Usage to Capture its Buzz Value: 
The continued confusion around its terminology is 
creating a pressure on philanthropic funders to 
call themselves impact investors (sounds cooler 
at cocktail parties) and to provide funding only 
through impact investing when the vast majority of 
social businesses currently need grant-like impact 
giving which may be more appropriate for those in 
seed- and early-stages.
• Buzz Around the Topic in Schools: As the impact 
investing space becomes even more popular 
(as evidenced by the number of MBA and MPA 
courses, and student social entrepreneurship clubs 
catering to this demand), there is a risk of a glut of 
new impact investment funds that will attract self-
declared impact investors who lack the experience 
in the sector and who may pressure the impact 
fund portfolio managers to “close deals” to justify 
their existence. This potentially could create a 
pressure to lower the selection standards especially 
when “investment” results may not be evident 
for another three to seven years. If the promised 
financial returns do not occur within the anticipated 
time, the investment will euphemistically turn into 
“patient” capital. 
• Impact Investing is Not for All Social Businesses: 
For the small handful of social businesses which 
have won multiple social venture competitions and 
awards, they will expectedly find impact investment 
money chasing after them, thus reinforcing the 
cool factor around the term. However, this leaves 
the vast majority of seed- and early-stage social 
businesses spending a disproportionate amount 
of time seeking impact investment funding when 
they should instead be seeking grant or impact 
giving funds that is more appropriate for their 
organisational life stage. This hype around attracting 
impact investments as a success measure can 
be counterproductive as it risks encouraging a 
mission drift among seed- and early-stage social 
businesses to attract this type of funding rather 
than staying focused on their intended mission.
A Call to Action: Need for More Impact Giving Support 
Many supporters of impact investing, including this author, 
would like to see impact investing eventually emerge as an 
asset class in its own right and thereby unlock the hoped-
for billions of dollars in the global capital markets to fund 
social businesses that address pressing social needs whilst 
generating financial returns.
”
The hype around attracting impact investments as a 
success measure can be counterproductive as it risks 
encouraging a mission drift among seed- and early-
stage social businesses to attract this type of funding 
rather than staying focused on their  
intended mission.
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However, to get there, philanthropic funders and social 
businesses alike need to be aware that impact investments 
are appropriate only to the small handful of fast growing 
social businesses with demonstrated impact and sustainable 
business models. It is not an appropriate funding type for the 
vast majority of social businesses that are more appropriately 
funded by impact giving and other grant-like philanthropic 
funding, where financial returns are not imperative. 
Having this broader understanding of impact investing 
as a complement to other philanthropic funding tools/
approaches such as impact giving for seed and early stage 
social businesses will hopefully provide them with a clearer 
path to funding goals that are in line with their intended social 
missions rather than forcing them to alter their business 
models to cater to impact investors. This would be a clear 
recipe for disaster and disappointment. 
Five years after the coining of the term “impact investing,” 
it is imperative that all the stakeholders—funders, 
intermediaries, and social entrepreneurs alike—should move 
beyond the hype and have a clearer understanding of the 
broader philanthropic funding landscape and tools that are 
appropriate to social businesses as they scale. Impact giving 
as an alternative approach, while still uncoordinated, is a 
more appropriate philanthropic financing tool for seed- and 
early-stage social businesses to receive funding.16
Social Finance
  Lien Centre for Social Innovation     47
1 In this article, social businesses are used interchangeably with social enterprises. The common theme is the intention to achieve 
 social impact while generating earned revenue sources and wean off the dependence on donor funds. 
2 It is beyond the scope of this article to debate whether this is an asset class or a series of asset classes as segmented by the 
 type of financing (ie. debt, equity or hybrid instruments).
3 In this article, the perspective taken is mainly from the funders’ side unless stated otherwise. Impact investing, in this context, is 
 an investing approach where investors seek to achieve social and environmental impact whilst expecting a positive financial return  
 on a risk-adjusted basis.
4 JP Morgan 2010 report entitled “Impact Investments: An Emerging Asset Class” 
 (www.jpmorgan.com/pages/jpmorgan/investbk/research/impactinvestments)
5 Mission drift typically pertains to a situation where an organisation’s mission begins to stray from the original intent in favor of 
 achieving more earned revenues.
6 Two reports: 1) Acumen Fund article (February 2012) entitled “Creating a capital curve for social enterprise” 
 www.acumenfund.org/knowledge-center.html?document=321 and 2) Monitor and Acumen Fund report (April 2012) entitled  
 “From Blueprint to Scale” www.mim.monitor.com/blueprinttoscale.html
7 As of April 2012.
8 Acknowledgements to LGT Venture Philanthropy team for the statistics provided.
9 This 1% success rate is used purely for illustration purposes and it refers to success in terms of raising impact investing funding 
 rather than to being successful social businesses. It is based on two global and more established impact investors and the  
 author does not simplistically extrapolate this as reflective of the broader social business landscape. However, a point still needs  
 to be made that the challenges that Asian funds face is no different from the global trends, which shows that investment firms are  
 struggling to find investment-worthy social businesses.
10 Asia Value Advisors research brief (October 2011) entitled “Impact Investing in Asia: From Definition to Pathways to Scale via 
 Impact Giving” http://value.asia/our-competencies/research
11 Avantage Ventures report (August 2011) entitled “Beyond the Margin”
 www.avantageventures.com/sitedocs/av_report_final_full_screen_version.pdf
12 Base of the Pyramid is defined as the largest and poorest segments of population living under US$2/day. In Asia alone, 2.9 billion 
 (out of 4 billion globally) live at the bottom of the pyramid (75%) even as the region has been growing the fastest compared to the  
 US and Europe. 
13 To be clear, while the number of social businesses will rise (denominator), the number of impact investment ready social 
 businesses is expected to grow faster (numerator) thereby increasing the % share of “impact investments” in the coming years
14 I do not feel strongly about coining a new term—impact giving—as admittedly it too has its imperfections in capturing the nature 
 of this funding type. However, to call it “impact investing” when it is clearly not an “investment” in the traditional sense understood  
 by mainstream investors risks undermining its ability to emerge as an asset class. 
15 To be clear, this article does not imply that to grow in scale, a non-profit should transform itself into a social business, nor should 
 a social business alter its business model just to tap into impact investors’ funding. Some social business, by virtue of its social  
 mission, may choose to continue to seek grant funding even as it scales by virtue of market or government failure to address a  
 target need/beneficiary. 
16 Acknowledgements: The author would like to acknowledge the invaluable feedback and contributions of the following individuals 
 and organisations, notably: Christoph Kramer (HKUST/BCG), LGT Venture Philanthropy team, SOW Asia Foundation team, Clare  
 Boland Ross, Sarah Allen (Intellecap/UnLtd India), and Alexander She (HKUST).
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